Marines At The Cua Viet

The Right Flank of the Third Marine Division (1967 - 1968)

In June of 1997, my older brother, Seabron Burson Johnson, Jr., a Korean War era Marine artillery officer, and I toured some of the battlefields of our nation's Civil War. We had utilized the Internet and discovered our Great-grandfather, James Madison Martin and his brother, Randolph, had enlisted in the Confederate States Army at the ages of 18 and 16, respectively. Both had traveled from their home in the southwestern corner of their state, Fort Gaines, Georgia, to Macon to enlist in the 10th Georgia Division as cavalrymen. The division was a composite of Alabama and Georgia men and units under the command of young Brigadier General "Fightin" Joe" Wheeler, an Alabamian and graduate of West Point.

Our tour route was simplified as we used a biography of Wheeler's military history, complete with maps covering engagements through Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, North and South Carolina. As we visited each of the battle sites and read of the 10th Georgia's involvement in the bloody encounters, a realization came to both Seabron and myself. I confirmed our mutual feeling when I opined that it was a shame that neither James nor Randolph left a written record of their wartime experiences for their descendants.

Over time, the germ of the idea to leave some record of my own experiences in Vietnam took root. Two casual conversations prompted growth of the idea to create a more formal account.

One of my troops out of my last tour in Vietnam asked if I would assist him in submitting a letter of our experiences. The letter would serve as an enclosure to his application to the Department of Veterans Affairs to support his claim for disability. I drafted a personal account that related to experiences of the unit, Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, and particularly his platoon. As this Marine's company commander, I endeavored to be specific in detailed examples of combat encounters his platoon had experienced. Accuracy was of great importance, as one could not chance a mistake for fear of the possibility of a reviewing board's disallowing the validity of the document in support of his claim. Completed, the letter was forwarded and served to assist the Marine's claim for disability as petitioned.

The realization of having prepared a segment of the history of our battalion's Vietnam service during 1967 and 1968 was obvious in itself. Not until I discussed the brief history with another of my Marines from our company did it take on a greater significance. Michael Silverman, now an executive in marketing and sales, asked if I might share the battalion's history with him. I assured him I could and would personalize it for him to pass on to his family when the inevitable question arose, "What did you do in the war?" Additionally, I indicated I would incorporate maps, photographs, unit citations and any other pertinent documentation available. Upon its completion my wife and I delivered the document to Mike and his lovely wife, Louise, at our next meeting as guests in their Rhode Island home.

The short history prepared for two of my Marines forms the basis of my account of my third tour of duty in Vietnam. Assignments during the period, from April 7, 1967 to March 5, 1968, included Battalion Operations officer (S-3), from April 7, 1967 to September. 21, 1967, and Commanding Officer (CO) of Company A (Co. A), September 22, 1967 to March 5, 1968, in the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF.

While elements of this paper have served two individual's purposes so far, it will now serve as an account of my own observations as a battalion staff officer and company commander of Marines for my descendants. On the encouragement of the fine staff of the US Marine Corps University Research Archives, Gray Research Center, Quantico, Virginia. It will remain on file for access as a reference document if chosen to be so or a record for descendants of the Marines who may desire to have an understanding of their ancestor's experience in combat. Therefore, what follows is not an account that serves a single purpose of one of two veterans of Vietnam but all those who served in the 1st Amphibian Tractor battalion during the time they occupied the position at the Cua Viet and operated beyond the perimeter in defense of that base against the North Vietnamese Army regular forces.

Since I am not a published author or a qualified historian, I wish to leave no doubts in anyone's mind that this paper is just an individual's account of what was seen and conclusions derived thereupon. As such, it is a monograph that is strictly based on one's personal observations, experiences and some verbal accounts shared with other Marines at the time that served in the 1st AmTrac Battalion. Through its flaws and imperfections, a perspective can be drawn of just how complex and challenging circumstances were met, and, for the most part, overcome by Marines dedicated to uphold precedent standards of performance in combat, the highest being Semper Fidelis.

Just as one Marine meeting another first checks for the other's rank, each renders military greetings appropriately, but ultimately checks the other's badges and decoration above the left breast pocket. Enclosure (1) is offered to the reader of this monograph in greeting. Therein lies the proof through Presidential, Naval, and Marine Unit Commendations as valid proof that the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, a combat support unit, was transformed into a combat unit in 1967 in Vietnam, faced off against regular North Vietnamese units in combat and prevailed to the honor of the traditions of the Corps.

The monograph that follows is an effort to reflect the deeds of a single battalion of marines who did an unusual job and earned the right to call themselves Amphibian Tractor Infantrymen, "Amgrunts."

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The, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, FMF, had been in the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) for approximately two years (having landed Co. B over Red Beach 2 on July 8, 1965 in Danang, Republic of Vietnam), and operated around Da Nang in support of the regiments and battalions of the 3rd Marine Division as a combat support battalion. Its primary mission was, using organic assault amphibious vehicles (LVT 5A1 family of vehicles) to transport assault forces from ship-to-shore against heavily defended enemy beaches and perform combat support operations as directed once ashore.

In less than two weeks after being assigned to 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion in Da Nang, the battalion headquarters was advised on April 18, 1967 of a pending movement to the north. An advance party consisting of the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Albert R. "Ray" Bowman, USMC, Maj. Poindexter M. Johnson, USMC, and CWO-3 Harry Florence, USMC, flew via helicopter to the Cua Viet River mouth on the South China Sea to conduct a reconnaissance of the location for establishing a battalion base of operations. Shortly thereafter the division passed the order to move from Da Nang without Company A. The battalion headquarters arrived at the Cua Viet on April 25 and was followed by Co. A on April 27.

Company B was already located at the Cua Viet under the competent command of Captain John B. Legge, USMC. Capt. Legge and his Marines had been providing local security for the Naval Support Activity (NSA). The NSA group provided port facilities for offloading supplies and equipment from naval vessels and subsequent movement of these vital five classes of supplies up the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha.

A map of the northeastern sector of South Vietnam below the DMZ identifying major towns and tactical Strong Point Obstacles is provided as Enclosure (2).

Upon arriving at the Cua Viet, Company A occupied the battalion area just south of the Naval Support Activity (NSA), at the mouth of the Cua Viet river and facing west toward the northern most end of the "Street Without Joy," made famous in Bernard Fall's book of the same name. The battalion's position formed a semi-circle with one end on the Cua Viet river west of NSA and arching around to tie in with Company B to Alpha's left flank and Headquarters and Service Company to the left flank (south) of Bravo. The battalion occupied the ground within the perimeter that ran approximately 400 meters south looking west over coils of concertina wire and "tangle foot" strands of razor and barbed wire, interspersed with bunkers and fighting positions. The South China Sea stood behind the battalion and NSA (Naval Support Activity) as their eastern boundary.

The Assistant Operations Officer, CWO-3 Harry Florence, laid out these defensive barriers. Gunner Florence was a veteran of WW II and the Korean Conflict. Steeped in valuable experiences, this war-wise Marine made great contributions to the battalion's successes each day.

In addition to the Battalion units and NSA, Marine engineers and Navy Construction Battalion detachments supported the Cua Viet position. They provided fuel storage, water collection and purification and construction. On the point of land at the confluence of the Cua Viet River and the South China Sea was LVTH-6A1 Platoon, a direct fire and indirect support 105 mm howitzer amphibian battery, the primary source of our direct support artillery.

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Initially the battalion's mission was to provide local security to insure the uninterrupted offloading of supplies by NSA from naval amphibious shipping (LST and LCU), for trans-shipment by NSA landing craft, LCM-6, LCM-8 and LCU, up the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha where the 9th Marine Regiment headquarters along with their re-supply and distribution center was located.

The original mission of the battalion would soon undergo an historic change. Local security was to be expanded beyond the battalion perimeter and north shores of the Cua Viet River. The expanded mission would extend the battalion's northern boundary some twelve to fifteen thousand meters to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and move its southern line seven thousand meters below the battalion's compound. The battalion's western operational boundary would be extended approximately five to seven thousand meters from the beaches of the sea inland.

The original battalion organization was that of an amphibian vehicle battalion responsible for transporting infantry from ship to shore during assaults and conducting combat support operations after the initial landing. All this was about to be changed.

Once the battalion had been encamped in its new positions and gotten its defenses in place, it began to expand its patrols during the day and establishing listening posts during the night. Patrols had been limited north of the Cua Viet River as we had been reminded that territory belonged to the 1st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). All patrols had to be cleared with their liaison officer attached to the advanced 3rd Marine Division headquarters (Bravo Command) at Dong Ha. Many times approval to conduct daylight patrols across the river would arrive days after having been requested. Refer to Enclosure (2) and note the tactical boundary designating the area east of Highway 1 to be the responsibility of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

The Division's forward command apparently heard our complaints. No doubt the issue was brought to the attention of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters in Da Nang. Once a decision was made, General John Chaisson flew in by helicopter and was escorted into the battalion headquarters tent for a briefing from the battalion commanding officer, Lt. Col. Ray Bowman. The general listened attentively until the colonel concluded. He then stood and asked to see the battalion patrol overlays. As the general placed the overlays onto the tactical map of the area, he made a telling remark.

"Colonel Bowman, you will have to operate farther afield to protect the compound from direct assault and from 82 MM mortar fire from reaching the NSA offloading ramp."

The general then picked up a black grease pencil and began drawing the new boundaries of the battalion's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). As he drew the lines he outlined the new additional mission for the battalion to assume immediately. In just a few short minutes the battalion went from being a combat support battalion to that of a combat command with the same responsibilities of that expected of a regular infantry battalion for a TAOR. Later the mission would undergo a minor modification that was not unexpected at the time.

It would be foolhardy for one to say that such an awesome mission had not just been laid on an unsuspecting commander and his staff. There was no doubt that Lt. Col. Bowman was taken aback at Gen. Chaisson's casual sweep of the grease pencil and clear explanation of how the battalion was expected to move out smartly to locate, fix and destroy any Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars in the assigned area of responsibility.

While not showing any signs of unwillingness to assume the mission vigorously, Col. Bowman did appear to be doubtful of adequacy of equipment and additional essential personnel to undertake and accomplish the assigned mission. He voiced these concerns in a most professional manner. Gen. Chaisson deflected these concerns and assured Bowman his considerations could be reviewed and addressed at the battalion's parent division headquarters with that staff.

The new mission literally changed the battalion into an infantry unit. To accomplish this, the two letter companies, CO's A and B had to undergo reorganization and retraining. The H&S Co., to a lesser degree would also incorporate infantry elements, but still existed to support the letter companies administratively and logistically. Areas of Operation (AO) were assigned with Cos. A and B sharing responsibilities north of the Cua Viet River and H&S Co. alternating with Co. B. for that half below the Cua Viet. Assignment of patrol sweeps and search and destroy missions were to be coordinated between the battalion operations shop and each company headquarters. The emphasis of applying a greater degree of command oversight was required by Lt. Col. Bowman and rightfully so. He voiced his concerns regarding the lack of infantry operations training and experience within the letter companies. He insisted on detailed planning before each movement outside the wire and beyond the river before taking to the field. Thorough debriefs were equally insisted upon when units returned to base. At first, the colonel, operations officer (S-3), and assistant S-3 reviewed all pre-operation briefs. Debriefs from squad and platoon size patrols were generally only received by the S-3 and his assistant, Gunner Florence.

At this point it is worthwhile to restate that Gunner Florence was, without a doubt, the most combat experienced Marine officer, having served with infantry and tracked combat vehicles. His briefing and debriefing skills and techniques, down to inspection of each Marine's roles and missions and each item of equipment and munitions, was an education for all in attendance. Gunner Florence's style of delivery was that of a knowledgeable and sincerely concerned but firm and resolute father sending his own sons in harms way. The Marines responded accordingly and hung on each wise suggestion, order and, where necessary, demand. The value of such knowledge and developmental proficiency is not measurable. It is sure to say that the Marine's performance was greatly enhanced by the "Florence Touch." After all, the VC and NVA lost more men than did 1st AmTracs.

Moving from a dedicated amphibian vehicle mission to a totally new mission required a great deal of retraining. The emphasis required progression in scales of unit sizes and types of operation. A cursory review of one platoon's knowledge and experience revealed that all units would have to begin at the beginning. The battalion did not posses the personnel in senior Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) and officers to establish a duplication of the state side Infantry Training Regiment. Ideally this infantryman's military occupational specialty schooling would have trained our Marines with Infantry skills essential to meet the enemy on a par in combat. That was not to be the case. The Amtrackers, at best, would receive their infantry training on the job under the rules of hard knocks.

It is significant to note at this juncture that no doctrine existed in the Marine Corps that established the policies and procedures for literally grounding one whole amphibian tractor company, Company A, and one-half of another, two tractor platoons of Company B, augmented with H&S Company Marines as directed by the Battalion commander. Additionally, absence of such a doctrine precluded the augmentation of essential combined arms personnel and a multitude of critical equipment. The far reaching ramifications of this reorientation of a tracked vehicle battalion with existing organic personnel shortages, absence of new mission critical equipment, and support personnel became more pronounced when the standard infantry commands are compared with those of the Amtrackers.

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Reassignment of a mission by the division did not include the reallocation of equipment to accomplish the infantry type tasks ahead. This fact would have serious consequences in future engagements with the VC guerrillas of South Vietnam and regulars of the NVA streaming down from the North.

The Table of Organization and Equipment for the battalion authorized only those personnel and equipment to conduct tracked vehicle support to infantry units. Now that the battalion was effectively "grounded," it had to be reorganized for retraining and conducting infantry operations. These initial organizational and operational changes meant engaging the enemy while learning small unit tactics with limited firepower, communications, and no tactical support personnel from combined arms firepower commands. For example, the new infantryman (the Amtrackers) carried the 7.62 millimeter (mm), M-14 semi-automatic rifle while regular infantry carried the newer .223mm, M-16. The latter has a larger volume of ammunition in each magazine (30 rounds versus 20 in the M-14), a higher rate of fire, and deadlier velocity and killing impact. All other basic personal equipment was equal to that of regular Marine infantry, such as helmets, clothing, and flack jackets. The hand grenades, smoke and flares were common to both. The regular grunts had the 40mm, M-79 grenade launcher. This allowed the infantryman a stand off from the enemy of up to 450 yards versus heaving a hand grenade 10 to 15 yards with limited accuracy. The regular infantry squad was organized with the M-60 medium assault machinegun. This weapon afforded the infantry units the heavy base of automatic weapons fire from which to maneuver. The new infantry units had no such lightweight, heavy firepower weapon serviced by two men. Instead, they had the .30-caliber machinegun, taken from their AmTracs, which was air cooled and employed by a team of three, gunner, assistant gunner, and one ammunition carrier.

Over time, the new infantry managed to acquire more and more M-60 Machine guns and some M-79 grenade launchers. These weapons were rotated around between the platoons as they took the field on patrols. This practice was continued until more and more of these weapons were equally distributed by late 1968.

Indirect firepower, organic to the infantry, was made possible with 60mm and 81mm mortars. No such weapons were available to the new infantry. Here again the new infantryman was limited in firepower that could reach out and engage the enemy, thereby delivering killing fire on them, disrupting his formations and slowing his advance, ideally fixing him on less defendable ground.

Heavier indirect firepower was assigned to the Amtrackers in the form of the LVTH-6A1 (How-6), the amphibious vehicle that was mounted with a 105mm howitzer. The How-6 platoon, a six-weapon battery, was capable of delivering both indirect and direct fire support on enemy targets. Normally in the amphibious assault, the "How-6s were the first assault wave, delivering direct fire onto enemy positions. Once ashore, they took up regular artillery battery firing formations and delivered indirect fire that was adjusted by artillery forward observers (FO), who might be drawn from the How-6 platoon or from the division's artillery regiment. These personnel were not provided along with the new mission assigned to the Amtrackers.

The next level, or priority of artillery support, general support fires, was available from the artillery regiment, 12th Marines. Access to this support would have to go through a Fire Direction Center (FDC) at the battalion. It didn't exist. Here is where the How-6 unit located within the defensive perimeter of the AmTrac battalion and NSA picked up the slack. They became the battalion's Fire Direction Center (FDC) in conjunction with their battery fire control responsibilities. Initially, it was realized that any calls for fire support to operating forces outside the compound area would have to be conducted via radio from the requesting unit to the operations office (S-3), thence via land line for all fire missions that could be fulfilled by the How-6 weapons.

Effectively, the S-3 could run an interim Fire Direction Center. Landlines to the artillery had to be used, as the How-6s did not have sufficient radios to monitor multiple company conduct of fire networks, hence a priority of fires had to be established by the S-3.

This communications network proved to have two significant flaws. The landline from the S-3 to the How-6 platoon fire control center was vulnerable to enemy artillery fire. Early on, the line was cut twice by NVA 130mm artillery fire. Note in Enclosure (3) the firing fans of the enemy artillery reach beyond the mouth of the Cua Viet River. This demanded that radios be used with landlines as backup. To accomplish this, the battalion had to remove vehicle-mounted radios from LVT-P5A1s to be installed in the battalion command bunker and that of the How-6 command bunker. This move not only eliminated the vulnerability of command control over landlines; it increased responsiveness of calls for fire by the How-6 battery to supported units in the field. Effectively, it allowed the S-3 to monitor the calls for fire as they now went direct to the How-6 battery. The S-3's silence constituted consent for the fire mission.

If calls for fire could not be satisfied by Cua Viet sources, the mission was kicked up to the 12th Marines. In this case, the request would go to the Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) at the division level. In order to accomplish this, communications equipment in sufficient quantities with the appropriate very high frequencies would have to be distributed throughout the battalion from the platoons up. Within the companies, there was only one PRC 25 per platoon. At a minimum, each new rifle platoon needed a PRC 25 radio as the tactical communications net. This was essential for coordinating within the company during a fight. At the company headquarters, another PRC 25 was necessary as the administrative radio to net with battalion to handle logistics (supply, medical evacuation, and non-tactical traffic).

A most critical minimum requirement in communications was the need for a tactical conduct of fire network capability with which to call the FDC to receive and adjust mortar and/or, artillery fires on a separate conduct of fire net for the platoons and company commander's headquarters group.

The battalion lacked corresponding communications equipment with networks and trained personnel to establish a complete FDC in the battalion and personnel and equipment to interface with the division FSCC for the conduct of combined arms (direct and general support artillery, naval gunfire support and close air support) fire support for fielded platoons and companies. At the company level this was partially remedied by removing vehicle-mounted radios from command tractors (LVT-Cmd). Mounting these radios in bunkers solved this communications need to a degree, but it did not satisfy the need for backpacked radios required in the field. There were absolutely no backpack radios by which to contact the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) for close air support. In fact, the battalion had no network authorization to call for such support.

The need for radio communications equipment in the Combat Operations Center (COC) went beyond just operational needs for coordinating combined arms fire support. There were logistical and administrative reporting requirements added to the battalion's reports list. In time, almost all these equipment and network needs were filled, however, not all the personnel to operate and maintain the equipment were provided by the division headquarters.

The field operations needs affected the letter companies, Alpha and Bravo, most directly. There was a need for a radio, an operator, and Forward Air Controller. (FAC). At the battalion, no back pack communications equipment with which to interface with air support was authorized nor available. The trained personnel to field and conduct naval gunfire support were equally absent.

All these communications needs were being noted and being made known to not only to Lt. Col. Bowman by his staff but such needs were being sent up to the division headquarters by Capt. Leo R. Jamieson, USMC. As the battalion's Communications Officer, he managed to shift assets and reassign personnel to cover needs from existing assets in a remarkably efficient manner. His persistent and professional approach to the battalion's requirements at the division level progressively filled many of the gaps and brought effective control to the command's overall communications.

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Another key factor not immediately apparent to the officers and most of the battalion SNCOs, was a change in the training policies of the Marine Corps. After it was determined that replacements had not been arriving in country fast enough to replace killed, wounded and men rotating out at the end of tours of duty, a far-reaching decision was made at the Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps level in Washington D.C., that directly impacted the combat effectiveness of the AmTrac Battalion. The Commandant of the Marine Corps approved deletion of Infantry training for all military occupational specialties (MOS) other than infantry at Infantry Training Regiments. This became apparent as Platoon Leaders and Company Commanders found many troops did not understand basic tactical arm and hand signals, small unit formations, fundamentals of other small unit tactics like covering fire with small arms and nothing about techniques and tactics for engaging and assaulting a fortified position. This lack of fundamentals for effective Marine infantry operations of small units had to be taught from scratch. There was not a sufficient amount of time to impress upon every Marine to embed the subject matter so that it became second nature when meeting the enemy. Instead, it was a quick training course and "hit the ground running" in the face of the enemy. Most of the officers and SNCOs knew but did not openly talk about the fact that this form of on the job training (OJT) would result in early and large numbers of casualties. The nuances of being an infantryman would come slowly but progressively with each combat encounter.

[On a personal note, Captain Johnson was the only officer, and for that matter only Marine in the battalion that had served in combat in Vietnam twice before. The first was a short tour with the Marine Advisor Team attached to the 2nd Battalion, Vietnamese Marines, in the Fourth Corps Zone usually referred to as the delta region. The second tour was as a Naval Aerial Observer, in the back seat of a single engine observation aircraft "Bird Dog," the O1-B. This involved controlling close air support missions for ground forces, adjusting artillery and naval gunfire, conducting radio relay communications; message delivery/pickup and hand held aerial photography. These missions were accomplished in support of the Marine helicopter squadron known as "Shufly" in 1963. The Marine squadron supported the Vietnamese ARVN, US Air Force Air Commandos aviation support elements to the ARVN, and US Army Special Forces A and B Teams throughout the First and Second Tactical Corps Zones. Shufly and the Air Force operated from the Da Nang airport. Between the second tour in Vietnam and before joining the Amtrac battalion, Capt. Johnson completed the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia. Effectively, this prepared him to operate an infantry battalion in combat in all respects. And now, the opportunity was at hand. However, the Amphibious Warfare School did not prepare future S-3s to reorganize, retrain and field Marines short-handed on combined arms support in the face of the enemy.]

Initially, the 3rd Marine Division, parent command of the 1st AmTrac Battalion, was responsible for the lion's share of the American forces operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone. When the 1st Marine Division joined the conflict, the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters was superimposed upon the two divisions for command and control over the entire I Corps Zone.

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Immediately following the battalion CO and S-3 receiving the new mission from General John Chaisson, Col. Bowman promptly broached the shortages and differences in equipment, support personnel, and supplies required to flesh out the battalion by presenting his needs to the division Chief of Staff and division staff officers. The colonel's return to his headquarters was not underscored with favorable results. Almost to the individual division staff officer the colonel was told much the same thing Gen. Chaisson had told him. Very effectively, they had advised the battalion to take advantage of the immediate situation during the apparent lull in enemy activity to reorganize and train. The colonel was somewhat discouraged and had literally returned to the battalion empty handed since he had distributed the multiple lists of personnel and equipment needs to the appropriate division staff.

It could not be determined then nor since whether the reasons for not immediately providing the battalion with equipment and personnel were a result of lack of both from stockpiles of equipment in country and lack of the necessary personnel replacement within the "personnel pipeline." Regardless of the reason the battalion ventured forth with shortages in all categories of personnel and equipment along with low levels of proficiency in their newly assigned mission.

The first company to be grounded and reorganized was Co. A, commanded by a reserve infantry/artillery officer, Capt. Roland Monnette, USMCR. A very energetic and enthusiastic officer, Capt. Monette quickly reorganized his company and set about a thorough training program. In short order, Co. A was conducting extensive local patrols for training as much as for security.

Bravo Company followed suit behind Alpha Company but with one proviso. Col. Bowman had been advised in a later meeting at the division CP to still be prepared to support the division and ARVN in future operations as Amtrackers with vehicles in their traditional mission. So while Co. B trained two platoons as infantry, they still carried the old mission of supporting the division and others with amphibian vehicles in Vietnam as well as tractors in support of Special Landing Forces (SLF) afloat. Therefore, Co. A was to be the battalion's lead infantry company, primarily responsible for all the AO north of the Cua Viet River. This assignment of primary responsibilities down to the companies became less a matter of hard and fast divisions of labors than it appeared on paper. Frequently, the two infantry platoons of Co. B rotated with Co. A north of the Cua Viet. Co. B engaged its fair share of hard fought combat just as did Co. A.

It became patently apparent to all officers and staff of the command that the battalion was now a Combat and Combat Support command. In addition, discussions at the division headquarters placed the emphasis directly on the command as being a combat organization responsible with the missions and roles thereof. While the officers and staff assumed an attitude of "can do," they were not without some doubts and trepidation. It must be remembered that many of the tractor crewmen, SNCOs and officers had supported the infantry in many operations, but as combat support units. While many had learned quite a bit by observation, they had not "carried the weight," as the Australian servicemen say.

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The total AO assigned to the battalion encompassed approximately thirty-two square miles. The terrain beginning at the shoreline of the South China Sea was an ideal beach with a near flat gradient. The beach rose to approximately five feet above mean low tide from 100 yards off shore interspersed over its breadth with dunes running up to ten feet with gaps between these elevations. Behind the berm and broken dunes was a growth of Australian pines mixed with native coastal brush and ground cover of weeds and some grasses. Beyond the Australian pines the area was completely barren and sandy as a desert. The sand was generally flat, providing very little cover or concealment for movement. The western edge of the desert was somewhat overgrown with native vegetation that followed a north-south creek. The growth on the east and west sides of this creek, dubbed Jones Creek, ranged in width from 3.5 thousand meters wide at the northern end to approximately 500 meters at its narrowest. This growth was thick and rambled in and out of numerous draws that drained into the creek. The dominant terrain feature along this western boundary of the Alpha Company tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was a large dune running north and south for about three hundred meters. It was approximately 100 meters wide and rose to just 31 meters. This terrain feature would prove to be a valuable observation post in future month.

As an historic note, Co A of 1st Amtrac's had been partially grounded once before during the Korean Conflict. Due to the strong influence of its commander at the time, a Major by the name of Treadwell, and an equally bold stable of platoon commanders, the company developed a reputation, which earned them the title of "Alpha Battalion." In Korea the company was located along the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) in fixed defensive positions. Local patrols using small units were conducted to sweep up line crossers, check civilians behind their positions and generally maintain rear area security. They were not reorganized nor equipped and retrained as infantry to go against main-force North Korean Peoples Army units in set -piece battles.

At the Cua Viet the battalion was beginning to operate successfully within the framework of their multi-faceted mission when Lt. Col. Bowman rotated back to the states and retirement. Lt. Col. Edward Rheb Toner, USMC, a veteran of Korea, and incidentally one of Treadwell's old platoon commanders in "Alpha Battalion" replaced Bowman. Toner had a thorough understanding of what was called for under the existing unique missions. He was a solid Marine, full of energy and determined to do the battalion proud in the eyes of the division. He declared his first priority was to acquire the weapons and communications equipment to do the work at hand. Toner promptly paid the new Deputy Division Commander, General Louis Metzger, an ally of the amtrackers, a visit, his wish list in hand. Unfortunately, he returned to the CP with nothing to show for his efforts except the assurance Metzger would go to work on the needs promptly. After all, that's the best that was expected. Over time General Metzger proved to be the battalion's strongest supporter for acquiring equipment and personnel.

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A summary analysis at this juncture reveals that while enemy contact was light, strong support for equipping the battalion remained in question. The troops still had minimal hardware assets with which to engage the enemy. History was repeating itself all the way back to Belleau Wood, France. During that battle in World War 1, the Marines literally "fixed bayonets" and fought the Germans face-to-face for every inch of that small hunting preserve. Some fifty years earlier, those Marines crossed open wheat fields under the German's withering heavy artillery and machinegun fire with little, if any supporting artillery. The naval gunfire was completely out of range in the Atlantic Ocean, and Marines had negligible organic close air support capability, a tactic not yet conceived, as we knew it in the sixties. Once again, as the modern day Marines advanced across open desert and paddy areas against increasing numbers of NVA delivering heavy caliber and light assault automatic weapons fires into their advancing assault ranks, history was repeating itself.

More than three decades after serving in Vietnam, my wife and I visited Belleau Wood with is pristine grounds and many thousands of graves arching across the front of the memorial tower. As we walked the road around the battlegrounds to move up into the forested sites of the famous points of the conflicts of hand to hand fighting, striking similarities of this battleground and those of the Cua Viet appeared before me.

The great wheat field before the famous hunting preserve was golden in its maturity, ready for the harvest. The June northeasterly winds sweeping the ripe stalks made the field undulate, giving it the curves and undulation of the water soaked dunes and desert scape of the Cua Viet. While these grain fields afforded Marines concealment against the sweeping German machine guns, the sands of the Cua Viet offered no such meager safety. The sands barely offered any protections over its barren expanse. It, like the wheat fields of Belleau Wood, proved to be almost perfect killing grounds for machine gunners.

The greatest weapon available to the Marines at Belleau Wood and at the Cua Viet was the most fundamental ingredient that spelled success throughout the years intervening since June of 1918. The ingredients were simply, solid training in the fundamentals of being a rifleman, and the tried and true traditions of having the grit to find, close with and destroy the enemy with the weapons at hand, meager though they may be at times.

I recalled while gazing upon the hunting preserve that at the Cua Viet the Amtrackers were not too different in their training than had been their forbearers. General Clifton B. Cates, USMC, was quoted as having related his disappointment in the lack of tactical training for he and his Marines before engaging the Bosch. He cited these regrets after the close of World War II, for he had seen the effectiveness of thorough training for combat in the Pacific campaigns. Obviously, I shared his disdain for lack of adequate training. Such as it was the battalion forged ahead with OJT with enemy forces before them, learning, refining and prevailing.

Daily short patrols conducted above and below the Cua Viet River took advantage of opportunities to learn the skills of the infantryman. Progressively the enemy was encountered more frequently but the Amtrackers learned and prevailed. After action critiques proved that the troops were rapidly becoming effective combatants against the VC, or Charlie as he was known. This was most apparent as the VC became fewer in numbers and the northern half of the TAOR and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), or Mister Charles, were more frequently engaged.

The diminished numbers of VC engagements were attributed to their losses, but another factor came into play. It was the tactic of the NVA to rule when they "took the field." In short, when the NVA prepared to engage the American and/or South Vietnamese, they relegated the VC to logistic support roles and preparation of defensive positions. Secondarily the VC was responsible for munitions and food and water supply as well as handling of dead and wounded. If NVA losses became high, the NVA commanders replaced their losses with Charlie. This left all the NVA units free to engage the enemy; the task they were best suited to perform.

The existence of an active VC element and imminent contact with increasing numbers of NVA was unquestionably in the minds of the battalion command staff and personnel. There was an even more nagging question facing the battalion. The battalion commander and his staff had no idea when or if the requested equipment would arrive. Foremost in their minds was to complete essential training inside the compound and progressively perform OJT at the same time expanding the range of patrols in concert with contacts with the NVA, and sweeps to insure security of the mouth and trace of the river. It was all too clear that short range operations could protect the battalion perimeter from enemy small arms attacks and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), but not enemy mortar fire, especially the 82 and 120mm weapons. The ranges of these weapons dictated pushing the patrols of platoons at a minimum out to at least 4,000 meters and even to the DMZ, some twelve thousand meters north.

In retrospect, it is difficult to recall whether regular infantry battalions operated with such long distance spaces ranging outside the immediate influence and responsive control of their companies and platoons. This does not question the tactic of employing Force Reconnaissance patrols from the division and patrols whose missions were to operate far afield. This far-reaching deployment tactic by the Amtrackers constantly gnawed at the mind of the battalion CO, S-3 and the company commanders. The possibilities for disaster by a platoon being swallowed up by a superior NVA unit were more likely than not to occur. Being nine or ten thousand meters from one's base and commanding 20 to 30 Marines on day and night patrols posed some awesome threats and called for fortitude of the first order by all at hand.

The battalion commander and S-3 did not sit and wait in denial of the inevitable. Early on, a plan was implemented whereby a Reaction Platoon, as a minimal force, was created. The plan dictated that the company with the fielded force would have on standby at least one platoon ready to mount up aboard an LVT and report crossing the Cua Viet River within ten to fifteen minutes for the run to the engaged unit. The same company was charged with establishing a second force and mounting up for departure within thirty minutes. It would only be launched if deemed necessary by the commander in contact, based on his best judgment of the strength of the opposing force. The specific details of the plan are not essential to this presentation. Suffice it to say that the Reaction Force was so frequently employed that the departure of the force and entry into the Cua Viet River could be accomplished within five minutes. Relief of the engaged force was more difficult and is discussed in detail below.

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Beyond the western boundary of the AO, the 9th Marine Regiment and units of the 1st ARVN Division carried the weight, but that was soon to change. The NVA moved 130 mm rockets down below the DMZ and launched simultaneous attacks from a single site against Dong Ha and Cua Viet. In addition, heavy artillery above the DMZ joined in on the duck shoot as we sat in the barrel late on the evening of June 12, 1967. Some 225 rocket and artillery shells rained down in and around the battalion position. Every unit in the perimeter wire was slammed hard. Many of the tents were blown away. Unprotected supplies went up in smoke and shrapnel ripped through the entire area, damaging communications wire, chopping trees down shattering windshields of vehicles, puncturing barrels of petroleum and lubricants. Injuries included one Marine killed and thirty three others wounded.

As an interesting note, the question arose as to the number of rounds that had hit the compound. Nobody had counted while burrowing deeper into crawl spaces and bunkers. One of the radiomen said the count was 225 rounds, and that he was certain of the count. When pressed to prove his point, he departed the COC and returned with his tape recorder.

"You see, sir," he began to explain to the S-3, Communications Officer, and Battalion CO, "I was just starting to tape a letter to my girl friend when the first round hit. I dove into my little bunker next to the hooch. When the rounds ceased, I came out and found I had left the recorder running all the time. When I played it back with my buddies, we counted an average of 225 rounds."

Listening to the tape recording of the rockets and artillery exploding once again reinforced the reality that we were in the enemy's bull's eye. There was no doubt about it. This was the heaviest bombardment of the battalion since arrival, but it would not be the last. Refer to Enclosure (3) for enemy firing fans.

Following this demonstration, the corporal kept his tape recorder close at hand. Each time the battalion was hit by rockets or artillery fire, he snapped the recorder on and took to his bunker to await the opportunity to give the S-3 the count when the all clear was sounded.

The loss of the first Marine certainly warrants some recognition. A 130mm rocket that overshot the southern boundary of the battalion compound killed the man. The Marine was Sgt. J. L. Kistler, USMC, and a member of the Maintenance Platoon of H&S Co. That evening, Sgt Kistler was the patrol leader of two fire teams of Marines set in for the night in an ambush position along a route suspected of being used by VC traveling between the Street Without Joy and the South China Sea and villages south.

One of the very first 130mm free-launched rockets fired at the Cua Viet compound overshot the position and impacted just a few meters behind Sgt. Kistler who was sitting on the rim of his fox hole. The blast and shrapnel of the exploding rocket instantly killed him.

Within a month from the attack, the battalion commander assembled representatives from among the battalion for an official designation and naming of the battalion position in memory of the young LVT mechanic and patrol leader. The base was dedicated "Camp Kistler".

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The battalion had been long overdue for many replacements. They had worked short handed since the AmTrac could be operated ashore with only two men as opposed to three if afloat at sea. Personnel began to arrive at the NSA ramp via landing craft from Dong Ha to flesh out platoons long overdue for replacements. Among the officers were several lieutenants fresh from The Basic School and other commands in the states. If my memory serves me correctly, most of the following lieutenants arrived in the same forty-five day period. The list included, but was not limited to:

Over the approximately ten months remaining on my tour of duty, I observed these young officers to be cut from the same bolt of cloth. They all proved themselves worthy of wearing the title of U. S. Marine. Their readiness to adapt to being infantry platoon commanders versus being AmTrac Platoon Commanders was commendable in spite of the fact they had all just completed the Tracked Vehicle Officer's School at Camp Del Mar, California. As each had previously graduated from that fine institution, The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia, as leaders of Marines, their fundamental knowledge of being ground combat officers was as solid as one could wish. They hit the field at the head of their platoons and soon proved their worth against seasoned NVA commanders and troops. There was one thing these lieutenants were challenged with on their tours as ground combat unit leaders. The challenge was that they had to prove the old Marine adage, "Every Marine A Rifleman." These young officers did not sell the Corps short in that trust bestowed upon them to be leaders under a variety of circumstances and missions.

Over time, it was discovered that the men the officers led were equal to the challenge in spite of limited preparatory skills training. Within the ranks of the enlisted were the first draftees who chose to undergo their tours as Marines. Some had no choice of services, but soon proved to be just as Marine as a volunteer. Some of the most competent troops were draftees with some college education and therefore more mature. Coupled with being "street smart," they made for valuable assets to units in transition. The battalion may not have been receiving desperately needed hardware, but quality Marines were there to carry the mission to the North Vietnamese when they crossed the DMZ.

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The battalion's history of being grounded for infantry operations in two different types of wars warrants some more detailed comparison. During the Korean era, the Amtrackers were deployed along the DMZ in bunkers and trenches across from North Korean forces. Infantry style small unit patrols behind the Marine positions were the order of the day. The purpose was to collect up civilian "line crossers" and small enemies' element infiltrating to disrupt rear area operations. Korean era Amtrackers were assigned to guard supply trains and bridges in rear areas. In the situation facing the Amtrackers in Vietnam, a distinctive difference existed. The DMZ was not manned as it was in Korea with trenches connecting strong points and fortified positions. Marine defenses along the DMZ in Vietnam consisted of "fire bases" constructed like enclaves surrounded with defensive wire, anti-personnel mines, circling trench works and deep bunkers, See Enclosure (2). Artillery and direct fire crew-served weapons delivered ordinance on the enemy as they operated within the DMZ and beyond. The nearest combat outpost to the 1st AmTracs was Gio Linh. Initially, there were no other combat outposts to the right flank of Gio Lin; just the South China Sea some nine thousand meters to the East. Therefore, the AmTrac Battalion was not confronted with "line crossers" and small enemy units as in the case of the Korean era. It was soon to find itself meeting and engaging large first-line enemy forces that were completely equipped and supported by adjusted mortars and artillery fires ranging from 82 to 152mm in size.

For the most part, few major encounters of the opposing forces took place below the Cua Viet River inside the battalion's TAOR. The encounters that did happen involved VC and a few NVA in very small units seldom larger than squads. Most prevalent of the threats in the south TAOR was the existence of booby traps. These took their measure in tolls of wounded among Co. B and H&S Co. personnel.

Progressively, the prototype engagements that prepared the letter company Marines for the larger actions came more frequently with each passing day as they operated north of the Cua Viet. These encounters were characterized by swift, fierce attacks through ambush or chance meeting engagements. Both forces suffered wounded and killed. Due to the swiftness of the encounters and quick disengagements of the smaller NVA forces , neither side could rightfully claim outright victory. After all, these were just fragments of the "protracted war," which by definition, was a war intended to wear the opposing forces down to such a degree that capitulation through political negotiations would prevail. The will of the Marines never even considered that option. Very simply, they were not politicians seeking to be re-elected back home. And now we know that the NVA had no intentions of coming forward under a white flag. Their motivation was nationalistic drive rooted in Communist dogma, almost to the extent of fanaticism in firefights.

It is not appropriate to infer that Alpha Company was solely responsible for operations above the Cua Viet. It was in fact, a shared effort between both letter companies. The shared responsibilities were effectively that Co. A would be the ground force while Co. B might be the tracked vehicle support. If the situation dictated and roles were reversed, it might well be that a Co. B ground force would require reinforcements during a particularly difficult encounter, and as such, Co. A could be called upon to launch their reaction platoon to assist their fellow Amtrackers.

In due course, the squad patrols expanded into platoon and then company operations. The intensity and ferocity seemed to increase with each encounter. Before long, the battalion's daily combat engagements began to draw attention at the division level briefings. The "box score" of enemy killed became as impressive as that of better-equipped and more seasoned regular infantry battalions.

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Body counts were a sensitive issue with Lt. Col. Toner. Early in his command, the colonel advised the staff and company commanders that the accepted old method of accounting for enemy KIAs and "probables" would not be tolerated. Soon after this commanders' meeting, he made himself even clearer. He had a basic rule about body counts. If you reported five NVA as KIA (killed in action), you had better be prepared to load five whole bodies into an AmTrac and ship them back as he might well direct. During the first company sized operation, of Hickory II (14-16 July 1967), Capt. Leo R. Jamieson as CO of Co. A reported a number of NVA KIA and a large quantity of weapons and ammunition captured, including an 85mm recoilless rifle. Lt. Col. Toner said, "Tell Leo to send the whole mess in by tractor." Within about half and hour, an AmTrac Crew Chief walked into the Battalion Combat Operations Center, saluted to the colonel and reported, "Sir, I've delivered the bodies and weapons as ordered." Capt. Jamieson's count was correct with all eleven dead NVA down to the last bullet of ammunition as had been reported.

Thereafter, Lt. Col. Toner would periodically order, "Send 'um in," and the company commanders would comply. The Battalion CO did not allow any "probable" KIA based on body parts and blood trails.

The word spread throughout not only the battalion but up to the division's G-3 about Toner's realistic "body count" system. Little by little, the 3rd Marine Division slipped away from the "probables" method of counting mystical enemy KIAs. Apparently, the division commander had his strong opinions about probables as well.

The frequency with which the Amtrackers were mentioned in Division briefings drew more and more attention to the Battalion's performance. General Snediker, Commanding General of the 3rd Division, called for the Amtrac CO to brief him personally following the Operation Hickory II engagements. Soon after this briefing, the battalion received a small issue of M-16 rifles, some M-79s and a couple of M-60 machine guns, the first of the slow stream of essential infantry equipment to come. The small dribble of M-16 rifles precluded issuance to the letter companies. They could not be burdened with mixed caliber of ammunition. Therefore, the first rifles went to the headquarters personnel.

General Metzger, the division ADC, kept his promise of support by sending two CH-46 helicopters loaded with a variety of command and control communications equipment and some PRC-25 man-packed radios. Several configurations of antennae sprung up around the battalion COC. One gift was a jeep mounted radio with operator that gave the Bn CO and Comm 'O' secure voice communications. It proved to be extremely helpful in affording the CO and Operations Officer direct voice communications with counterparts and superiors to resolve issues without fear of being listened to by the NVA. Their primary supporters, the Russians, provided their capabilities in receiving and listening in on our voice communications. We knew them to be well equipped and trained in this field.

The battalion was well aware of a stockpile of a variety of equipment stored in country that was reserved for the "MacNamara Line." This was the pie-in-the-sky conceptual plan wherein an "impenetrable" defensive barrier along the trace of the DMZ would deny NVA access to the south. In general, all the outposts would be interlocked with connecting remotely controlled and automated weaponry to cover dead spaces, some reacting to sensory devices forward of the weapon's position. These sensory devices would detect and report movements and an operator would activate the weapon or leave it on automatic function in heavy engagements. Rumor had it that the new comm gear received came from the communications equipment set aside to support the troops maintaining the "Line." The general consensus was that such a line was some technocrat's pipe dream and effectively, worthless. Logic dictated that the battalion knew that the equipment held in reserve for the questionable "MacNamara Line" could be better used for fighting the enemy confronting the Amtrackers. Therefore, such a suggestion offered to Gen. Metzger by the Battalion CO may have prompted some bean counter to relinquish the resources to the battalion. The fact that the equipment did come was sufficiently welcome aside from the presumptions of the politics involved for their release.

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Early in their new role, members of Company A became frustrated with not having organic indirect firepower, specifically, their own mortars. Through hook and crook, the CO, Capt. Roland Monette, scraped up some trading gear and some Vietnamese piastres to bargain with. Monette spotted a 60mm mortar tube at the RVN Naval Junk Fleet compound just up the river from the company's position. In short order a deal was struck for the Indo China vintage tube. There was no base plate, bipod, or sight and aiming stakes in the bargain. Such incidentals afforded the Alpha Company mechanics a welcome project. Within less than a day the tube had a makeshift base plate, a bipod made from a .30 caliber machine gun tripod. Sighting was accomplished by using a set of jury-rigged iron sights which allowed the gunner to aim in on a red and white painted set of bamboo poles circling the firing pit at precise points of the magnetic compass. The firing pit was dug in above the company command bunker where all communications was managed. Therefore, calls for fire could be coordinated to the gun pit via telephone from the company's perimeter bunkers onto probes of the line.

The mortar proved to be untrustworthy for all but short-range use. One evening a sentry walking his post along the beach in the Company B area observed a large group of fishing boats moving toward the shore. When he reported this observation, suspecting an amphibious raid no doubt, Capt. Monnette volunteered his services to shed some light onto the situation. He immediately manned the mortar with a crew and sighted in to fire an illumination round. The report of the mortar alerted all hands there was a fire mission underway. Much less than the usual 20 odd seconds flight time quickly passed as the illumination round struck the ridge pole of an H& S Company tent, and sent the round twirling like a baton tossed in the air. It burst into full brightness just ten feet above the surf among the closest fishing boats and continued to burn as it sunk below the waves. The fisherman got the message, veered off and moved farther south to the night of fishing.

The Company A troops did not lose faith in their brave old mortar. On platoon sized operations, they sent the tube and crew in support with full respect for its limitations on range. It would be removed from its position above the company COC, loaded aboard an LVT with an ample load of a variety of ammunition and travel north.

Once when a platoon engaged an NVA combat patrol and found them about evenly matched in force, the platoon commander called for the mortar to be moved up. It was still atop an Amtrac behind the engaged Marine platoon. When the LVT came forward, it drew fire from the NVA like a magnet attracts ferrous filings. Hundreds of AK 47 rounds bounced off the LVT hull. The fire was so heavy no one could remove the mortar. Momentarily the driver turned the vehicle by doing a neutral steer to lessen the fire impacting his side of the vehicle. An observant Marine, Sergeant John C. "Butch" Yates, seized the opportunity and dashed across the open space to the vehicle, climbed aboard from the rear and crawled to within grasping distance of the weapon and flipped it off onto the ground. He then seized a box of ammunition and threw it on the ground. Yates rolled off the Amtrac next to the pile, quickly dragging the tube and box of shells to a covered position. He did not have a base plate or any other hardware to deliver accurate fire. Yates improvised by removing his helmet and placed the ball of the mortar inside the hollow. He could observe the squads in contact with the NVA and from time to time, observed enemy movement. He dropped the first round into the old tube and saw it to be long. The second round landed in the NVA positions. Yates walked the rounds throughout the enemy fighting positions so effectively that their fire dropped to almost nothing. He took advantage of this lull once again crawled atop the LVT and threw off more ammunition for the mortar. Then the NVA tried to flank the Marine platoon. They were not only met with well-aimed rifle fire but accurate 60mm high explosive and white phosphorus (Willie Peter) fire. The combined hail of rifle and mortar fire proved to be too much for the NVA. The enemy survivors of this engagement soon broke off contact and slipped back across the DMZ under the cover of dusk and growing darkness.

Sergeant Yates, a communications specialist by training had proved the fundamental necessity for solid training, determination in the face of the enemy and bold initiative under fire. For his heroic action he was recommended for and received the Silver Star. Soon after his being decorated he was promoted to Staff Sergeant. Staff Sergeant Yates later earned the Navy Cross posthumously for trying to save a crewman trapped in a burning LVT that had hit an anti-tank mine in the midst of a furious firefight. See Enclosure (4).

As a footnote on the old Indo-China mortar, if one looks closely at the center of the photograph of the officers and SNCOs of Alpha company, the muzzle and part of the makeshift bipod can be seen behind the company sign. It was relegated to a monument status once the company received a modern 60mm. See Enclosure (5) of the Alpha company officers and staff posed around the old mortar, and Enclosure (6) of the old mortar with (then) company gunnery sergeant, GySgt. Donald Austin, USMC.

It was not until mid-February 1968 that mortars were issued to the battalion. Two 81mm mortars along with an infantry crew arrived for duty to instruct Amgrunts on the weapons. It was found that one of the Amgrunts in H&S company had been a mortar man before re-training to be an Amtracker. He assisted in the training of the Amgrunt mortar men. Following an intensive cycle, the infantry mortar men gave our men the blessing and departed to return to their old unit. The 81s remained at the battalion CP. They were never deployed to the field with the Amgrunt ground elements.

The regular infantry mortar men are worthy of a note of confidence. Upon their arrival certain observations led us to a good measure of appreciation for these Marines. While talking to them about their weapons, it was learned they had just departed from their 9th Marines unit, having been pulled out after a heavy battle around Cam Lo. The squad leader wore large bandages on his hands, wrists and forearms, as did his crews. On inquiring my suspicions were confirmed. The squad leader explained that the enemy assaulted on one flank of the battalion's position and got so close they could see the NVA soldiers working through their wire. Their position was so close to the riflemen's fighting positions, they had to grasp the overheated mortar tubes in their high angle positions to keep them from falling backwards from recoils. Also, he added, "We were firing the tubes using Kentucky windage directly onto them. There was no use using sights and aiming stakes. They were so close."

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The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion reputation as a true fighting force was growing on both sides of the DMZ. Shortly after the battalion arrived at Cua Viet and following a casual reference to a radio program by Hanoi Hanna, Capt. Monette jokingly transferred Hanna's reference to the battalion from the Amtrucks to Monette's version of Amgrunts. Capt. Monette even designed the appropriate military unit map symbol for the nickname. He drew a rectangle on a 5 inch by 7 inch file card, drew the oblong circle representing the tracked vehicle unit inside the box, added a wavy line horizontally through the track symbol and thereby designating it to be an amphibious tracked vehicle unit and then placed the infantry symbol of the crossed straps or "X" from corner to corner over all the other symbols. This symbol, he declared represented the "Amphibian Tractor Infantrymen" unit. With the addition of the battalion strength symbol of two vertical lines atop the box, Monette declared it to represent the Amgrunt Battalion. The card with symbol was promptly stapled to the entryway tent pole of the battalion headquarters tent for all to see and enjoy.

While the name "Amgrunt" began as an internal jocular nickname, it soon grew into a common reference by troops and officers alike in a more serious vein. Marines of Company A began to refer to themselves as the "Alpha Amgrunts. The nickname created a low-grade infection of some pride among the battalion personnel. Soon the term was being used in briefings at division to distinguish among the various units fighting in the northern I Corps Zone.

After Lt. Col. Toner replaced Lt. Col. Bowman, the former would chortle about the division CG questioning him about "how his Amgrunts were doing." This was a significant measure of recognition by the division Commanding General. Soon others at the division began referring to the battalion by their new name. That was a certain measure of the pride in which many Marines took in the earned reputation of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

Hanoi Hannah never got it right, or more correctly, she never changed from the origins of her nickname "Amtrucks." This nickname actually came from references she made about one of the first Marine Corps ground units to arrive in Vietnam. This unit was the Amphibian Truck Company from the 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion of the 1st Marine Division. They were sent to Vietnam in early 1961 under the command of 1st Lt. Ron Smaldone, USMCR, to train ARVN on the DUKWs, a World War II vehicle. The training completed, Lt. Smaldone and his truckers returned to Camp Del Mar. The equipment was left for the South Vietnamese.

When Hanoi Hannah announced their arrival she correctly abbreviated the amphibious trucks as Amtrucks. She was not correctly advised of the differences between an amphibious truck and an LVT-P5A1.

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As the Battalion continued in combat with the NVA, equipment and personnel needs became more noticeable at the Division. More and more hardware began arriving at the battalion. Munitions of the variety afforded regular infantry arrived from Dong Ha and Da Nang. Of particular note were the most useful Night Observation Devices (NOD). This came in two sizes, the Super NOD and the rifle mountable Starlight Scope. The battalion promptly put these to maximum use along the perimeter and on night patrols and ambushes.

Certain daily reports required by division headquarters were so long they were not transmittable in coded format by telegraph. Consequently, the report had to be prepared in plain text and delivered by a Marine aboard a helicopter or carried up the Cua Viet River aboard a Mike boat, thence to the 9th or 12th Marines communications center for transmission to division. Enough complaints were raised from the Regimental Comm Os to division that action was taken. A CH 46 helicopter arrived one day with boxes and cases of radios, power supplies and personnel to satisfy all of the battalion's secure communications requirements. This second flight of gifts rounded out the battalion's communications needs as it contained additional PRC-25 radios. Now the company COs had radios to utilize for dedicated conduct of fire networks.

Personnel rotated out to the states for re-assignment as well as being rotated out as casualties. The division did respond in stages and new personnel arrived with regularity. When Capt. Monette rotated out: his replacement, Capt. Leo R. Jamieson, initially the battalion's communications officer took command of Company A. These two Marine officers had much in common. Both were Alabamians. Jamieson, like Monette, was an infantry officer. Both were sharp intellectually and quick to respond to any situation thrown out by the NVA. Jamieson proved to be a very competent commander under fire as well. It was under his leadership that the company developed the greatest degree of confidence and effectiveness to date as demonstrated in combat against main force enemy. During Operation Hickory II, Jamieson led the Alpha Amgrunts in a successful search and destroy mission north of the Cua Viet while linked up with an ARVN battalion. The company killed 54 NVA and captured scores of individual and crew served weapons, as well as many types of ammunition. These kills and captures were the largest counts in the initial stages of the operation for the 3rd Marine Division and ARVN.

The Alpha Amgrunts demonstrated their combat effectiveness far above that of their counterpart infantry in the ARVN. At one point during the operation with that ARVN battalion abreast of Co. A, the force came to a halt to confer on the progression of the attack to the north along Jones Creek toward the DMZ to clear out NVA forces. The two command groups conferred, agreed on proceeding with priority of fires to the most heavily engaged of the two commands and moved back to launch the attack north at a specified time. When the appointed time arrived, the ARVN came under attack by enemy artillery and ground attack, as did Company A. Alpha stemmed the ground attack and as soon as the enemy artillery eased up Capt. Jamieson radioed the Marine ARVN liaison Officer, to move out as had been planned. Being led to understand that the ARVN battalion was on the move to Alpha's left, they went on the offensive. As Alpha began to engage more NVA to their immediate front and left flank, a Company A platoon leader made reference of his observations to Capt. Jamieson that the ARVN were not moving forward but were heading south. Capt. Jamieson sought to contact the ARVN commander and even tried raising the US advisor, to no avail. Halting his advance, Capt. Jamieson reported the incident to the S-3. Soon the AmTrac battalion CO was on the radio to the senior ARVN advisor and coordinating a meeting in the field to bring back on line the ARVN battalion to continue the advance. During the meeting of commanders in the field, no amount of coaxing or threats could right the situation. To add insult to the ARVN commander's loss of face, Capt. Jamieson realigned his Amgrunts and continued alone, successfully defeating the remaining NVA and completing the mission up to the DMZ.

Capt. Jamieson rightfully filed an official report of the ARVN commander's action in the face of the enemy and endangerment of an adjacent unit. The report was severely objected to by the ARVN battalion advisor who filed a counter protest against Capt. Jamieson. Unfortunately the liaison officer was a Marine. Jamieson's complaint stuck and was reported by the 3rd Division command to the 1st ARVN Division Commanding General who took corrective action, the measure of which was not fully disclosed to our commander. Nevertheless, Capt. Jamieson and his Alpha Amgrunts returned to the battalion area with an ample measure of prestige and gratitude from all quarters of the command at the Cua Viet and on up to the 3rd Division level.

Read more about Operation Hickory II here.
Hickory II (A) - The Plan and the View from the Top
Hickory II (B) - The View from the Ground

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The entire battalion's performance throughout that phase of Operation Hickory II sufficiently impressed the division command that the battalion's first Meritorious Unit Commendation was drafted and forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for signature. The battalion was to receive other commendations as the Amgrunts continued to perform in such superior style. A Presidential and a Navy unit commendation soon followed. The most rewarding Marine Corps commendation came later but is significant in one aspect from all the others. A review of that commendation reveals an interesting recognition and declaration of exactly who the battalion had become.

In 1969, General Leonard F. Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, included the Amtracker's nickname of Amgrunts (Amphibian Tractor Infantrymen) in a Meritorious Unit Commendation. Being so codified, that made it official for all time. A cursory review of the unit commendations of Marine commands reflects scant reference to a particular unit's favored nickname or moniker. No doubt, the Raiders of World War II might reflect their commander's names as a matter of unit differentiation versus a distinction that reflects particular recognition of fulfilling the old Marine adage, "Every Marine a rifleman." Certain aviation units bore nicknames representing what they did under their mission, such as "Night Fighters," and "Eyes of the Division" (VMO-2), or "The walking Dead of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, for example. It is worthy of note here that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was justifiably impressed with the battalion's added mission performance as infantrymen that he felt the addition of Amgrunt to their title surely represented noteworthy recognition. Therefore, the Commandant codified the old moniker as an earned title, no longer a joke nor a nickname.

The Battalion enjoyed a stand down from infantry operations as the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Special Landing Force, (SLF 2/3) was landed north of the Cua Viet for operations on or about 19 September 1967. Company A and Company B of the Amgrunts temporarily reverted to supporting regular infantry operations with their tractors. The 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines conducted an extensive search and destroy operation throughout the entire AO north of the Cua Viet. The 2/3 SLF Marines received their first taste of heavy enemy artillery as both direct and indirect fire. The caliber's ranged from 100mm up to 152mm. Enemy artillery attacks in these calibers were common for the Amgrunts. Fortunately, the sandy terrain along the coast proved to be one of the greatest assets for saving Marines lives.

Initially, it appeared the NVA used fuses that either had quick and delay only. This allowed the incoming rounds to penetrate deeper into the sand. The deadly killing radius of fragments was therefore focused upward in a tighter cone. Had the soil been the hard red clay like that in Dong Ha, the exploding round's lethal cone would have been flatter, even horizontal in some cases, and thereby more deadly. The absence of the use of super-quick fuses was not to last for long, however.

During the course of acting as the battalion's liaison officer to 2/3 SLF Capt. Poindexter M. Johnson was advised he would relieve the CO of Company A. Capt. Jamieson had delivered an impressive performance as a combat commander. The company was impressively ready for future engagements with the enemy.

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At the landing of the 2/3 SLF, the battalion headquarters at the Cua Viet became inundated with civilian newspaper combat correspondents. Two or three were non-American, and one of these was a French woman that wore a bright red bandana on her head. On first seeing her, the thought passed through the undersigned's mind that she would surely make a choice of all the NVA snipers as soon as she stuck her head out into the open. Interestingly, it almost became the case.

For some reason, all the reporters were placed on one LVT. As they rolled north past the 2/3 SLF field CP they appeared to be tourist on an outing dressed in casual clothes of blue jeans, shorts, various chambray and "T" shirts. Several had on jungle hats bought from the streets of Saigon and/or Danang. My second thought was that they probably imagined themselves as the main English character in Graham Greene's novel, The Silent American.

They had been cleared to follow a 2/3 company that moved north to the DMZ. When it turned west and parallel to the DMZ the reporters and photographers followed in trace aboard their tractor. When the infantry halted their LVTs to disembark among the rolling dunes, the correspondent's vehicle had no place to sneak into for cover. The NVA in the DMZ probably could not believe their luck. Instantly, the crack of a recoilless rifle, probably an 85mm, sent its calling card. It impacted just behind the P5. All hands on board let out their whoops, howls and screams for the driver to take cover - anywhere, and quick. The vehicle lurched forward, almost dumping half its passengers off the top. It had hardly moved twenty feet when it struck an anti-tank mine. Now all hands leaped and scurried off the tractor, immediately taking refuge among the dunes from recoilless rifles, AT mines and wild AmTrac drivers.

One among the civilian newsmen was a Marine veteran of WW II and photo correspondent from the Korean Conflict, David Douglas Duncan. As the day drew darker, most of the others had departed to the security of the battalion compound for hot chow, showers and safe bunkers. Duncan remained aboard the damaged tractor. When the crew chief called for assistance of track pins and extra track blocks, he confirmed he had a civilian onboard. A squad of Marines from 2/3 was sent out to protect the LVT until another tractor arrived with parts and mechanical help. On their return, Mr. Duncan jovially strolled into the 2/3 CP remarking that he had barely beat the returning tractors and Marines. He had walked the seven thousand meters alone, armed only with three cameras and a bag of exposed and unexposed rolls of 35mm film.

It was hard not to remind the famous photographer of the rules of not wandering off without adequate security. He was after all a Marine; having seen lots of combat, and war-wise. He explained he had judged the trip was safe as it had been swept earlier that day. There was no need to argue the possible calamities of infiltrators that could have killed him. Our sweep had been thorough and his logic was reasonably sound.

With the SLF 2/3 mission complete, an informal change of command took place in the commanding officer's hut at Co. A, on September 22, 1967. Shortly thereafter the 2/3 SLF back loaded onto their amphibious shipping. The battalion returned to the field as Amphibian Tractor Infantrymen, Amgrunts.

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The frequency with which NVA crossed below the DMZ increased dramatically at the beginning of October 1967. Company A, reinforced by Bravo company, began to encounter larger units. Amtracs operating throughout the company AO struck more and more anti-tank mines. The mobility and maneuverability of the Amgrunts against the NVA prompted their planting of more and more Communist Bloc TM-41 antitank mines, some double stacked to render greater damage to AmTracs. By the end of March 1968 AmTracs had struck more than 150 antitank mines.

The Russian designed anti-tank mines packed enough power to create a variety of immobilizing effects. Initially, the vehicle track would be chopped and generally one or two road wheel assemblies would be damaged. This entailed patching the track by the crew, many times under artillery fire. If the repairs were beyond a crew's capabilities, the damaged vehicle would be dragged back to the battalion maintenance platoon for repairs. In more unfortunate circumstances, the detonation of the anti-tank mine would also puncture the vehicle's lower hull plates, sever the flexible gasoline bladder closest to the entry point of the exploding mine and ignite the fuel. This resulted in severe flash burns to the driver. In almost all cases, the flash burns were so extensive, 50 to 75 percent, death resulted in spite of immediate medical treatment. Partial burns occurred to the lower part of the crew chief that usually stood in his hatch on the crew chief seat.

The threat of deadly burns was so compelling that it was not uncommon to observe two crewmen tossing coins to determine who would be driver north of the Cua Viet.

Most of the fires in the vehicle could be extinguished by releasing the CO2 tanks within the troop compartment, from outside the vehicle, and pull releases in the engine compartment. In this fashion the vehicle was not completely lost, however, many were and became shells for bunkers back at the battalion.

During a battalion reunion in 2002 at Quantico Virginia, one of the Amtrackers was discussing the fear of being "torched." He related that, "We certainly were crazy. There we were driving those LVTs in and out of mine fields, day in and day out. We didn't even sweep our trails with engineers and mine detectors. Were we or were we not out of our minds?"

Well, that's not exactly true. We did employ engineers to search for and detect mines for removal. There were just so many mines planted, it was almost impossible to find all of them. They were not laid in patterns. Instead, they were randomly planted at likely points between trees where an LVT might pass through a gap, or in a track used for a fast run north. In addition, engineers working in the open with headphones on did not hear the telltale muzzle blasts of the NVA artillery headed their way. The squads protecting them would hear the blasts of the muzzles and scream, "Incoming." All hands would scurry for cover. Usually only three or four rounds would be fired

How can you argue with such sound logic? We were crazy but we had to utilize mobility in so many instances. It kept the NVA off balance. That in itself made the difference so many times. By being able to deliver reinforcements so quickly, tipping the scales in numbers and arriving so quickly to foil the enemy tactics simply saved Marine's lives. Had we been afoot responding to a call for reinforcements, we would likely have arrived too late and surely would have encountered continuous artillery and mortar fire tracking our every step to the beleaguered Marine position. That would have been crazy - arriving too late.

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The NVA stepped up their heavy artillery attacks throughout the battalion compound as the winter months descended upon the area. Free-launched rocket attacks of the 130mm variety began to rain down on Cua Viet and Dong Ha in the middle of the night. These weapons had super quick, quick and delay fuses. Their killing zone was truly deadly in the sandy soil. The sounds produced by these huge missiles, as they were launching and roaring through their flight to a target were terrifying. The deep-throated roar that turned into a low musical whoosh left no doubt in anyone's mind that awesome destruction was on the way. These weapons were the same used by the Russian army against the Germans during World War II. The Germans named them "Stalin's Pipe Organs." That low melodious tone still lingers in the minds of all who have experienced it.

To counter this threat towers were built at Dong Ha and Cua Viet to elevated observation of open areas along the DMZ east of Route 1 between the Cua Viet River and DMZ. These towers were manned 24 hours a day and equipped with a coffee table sized compass card and sighting device to acquire a bearing on the rocket launch site. The intersecting magnetic azimuths of the Dong Ha and Cua Viet towers was then reported to division FSCC and counter battery fire was then returned. In one instance, as the first volley of rockets being launched, counter battery fire responded so quickly, the NVA broke off the attack, leaving 38 rockets not launched. Examination of the launch site by a 1st AmTrac patrol revealed the rockets were "free launched." A mound of sand was piled and sloped at the angle that would give the rocket its calculated trajectory to reach the designated target. Obviously, these rockets were not precision fire weapons. They were area fire weapons.

In spite of the towers, the rocket attacks continued. To prevent these attacks, division decided to expand the AO of the Amgrunt battalion farther west. The area where the attacks were coming from fell within the 9th Marines AO. Since they were so heavily committed west of Route 1, an area was carved out and assigned to the Amgrunts to patrol. The area was quickly dubbed the "Rocket Box," by one of the Company A platoon leaders, 2nd Lt. Donald R. Head, USMC, first to take troops into the Rocket Box.

These platoon-sized patrols presented a set of unique challenges. First, this placed a platoon at more than 12,000 meters from the battalion's position at the farthest extreme. Supporting fire from the How-6s was possible as long as the patrol was in the middle to lower portion of the Rocket Box. In a crisis, re